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4A B S T R A C T
7Since the 20th century, corporate governance mechanisms have 
been developed globally to curb the negative effects of the agency 
problem. South Africa was a pioneer with the publication of the fi rst 
King Report on corporate governance in 1994. Given the paucity of 
research on corporate governance in the country, the researchers set 
out to investigate the corporate governance practices of 230 companies 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange over the period 2002 to 
2010. Annual corporate governance scores were compiled by means 
of content analysis of the sample companies’ annual reports. The 
empirical fi ndings revealed an increasing compliance trend towards 
2010. Although the sample companies tended to improve the disclosure 
of their corporate governance practices over time, their practices were 
not per se acceptable (where acceptability implies meeting the King II 
recommendations). Inexperienced directors and managers might benefi t 
from more training to enhance their understanding of the application of 
corporate governance principles.
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1The Roman philosopher Plautus (in Stone 2005) warned that “it is a risky venture 
for a poor man to enter into a partnership with a rich man”. Since partners can 
be held personally liable for claims against the partnership, they tend to closely 
monitor the entity’s activities. Adam Smith (in Dowd 2009) argued that it cannot 
be expected of a company’s executives to monitor invested money with the same 
attentiveness as partners in a private business. During and after the Industrial 
Revolution (1760–1840), the optimal size and production capacity of corporations 
increased (Jensen 1993). As these growing corporations required more funding, sole 
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proprietorships and partnerships were increasingly replaced by public firms. As a 
result, the owner and manager of a corporate entity was not necessarily the same 
person (Holderness 2003).
The separation between ownership and control gave rise to the so-called 
agency problem (Van den Berghe & De Ridder 1999). This problem occurs when 
shareholders shift their responsibility to control the day-to-day and strategic decision-
making activities of a firm to appointed managers. Executives can possibly abuse 
their position for their own benefit rather than focusing on the wealth maximisation 
of the shareholders (Martin, Petty & Wallace 2009; Jensen & Meckling 1976). Due to 
more dispersed and changing ownership structures, the agency problem became even 
more prominent during the 20th century compared to previous centuries (Rossouw, 
Van der Watt & Malan 2002).
The concept of corporate governance originated from the agency problem (Daily, 
Dalton & Cannella 2003). To curb agency conflict and limit agency costs, an array 
of control mechanisms, such as an internal audit function and independent board 
members, has been suggested in corporate governance literature (Haniffa & Hudaib 
2006). Formalised corporate governance principles were introduced in South Africa 
in 1994 with the publication of the first King Report. Two subsequent reports 
were published in 2002 and in 2009. These reports provide corporate governance 
guidelines to companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Although 
the King Reports are not legally binding, the JSE Listing Requirements (JSE 2005) 
oblige listed companies to disclose the extent of their compliance with the King II 
guidelines in their annual reports. In the case of non-compliance, reasons should be 
provided (Mangena & Chamisa 2008).
Van den Berghe and De Ridder (1999) noted that corporate governance compliance 
includes two dimensions, namely ‘doing the right things’ and ‘doing things right’. In 
the light of this distinction, researchers should give attention to both the disclosure 
(‘doing the right things’) and acceptability (‘doing things right’) dimensions of 
corporate governance. Previous researchers (such as Abdo & Fisher 2007; Moloi 
2008; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt 2012; Opperman 2009) focused on the disclosure 
dimension of corporate governance, whilst examining the corporate governance 
practices of selected JSE-listed companies. The majority of these researchers only 
included large listed companies (such as the FTSE/JSE Top 40 companies) in their 
samples. Furthermore, they generally considered a relatively short time frame (five 
or less years). In contrast, attention was given to both the disclosure and acceptability 
dimensions of corporate governance in this study. The current researchers also 
considered a more representative sample (including companies from the Top 40, Mid 
Cap and Small Cap JSE indexes) over a longer time frame (nine years).
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The research period ranged from 2002, the year that the King II Report became 
effective, until 2010. The recommendations of the King II Report were applicable to 
JSE-listed companies for almost a decade. The King III Report came into effect on 
1 March 2010. Integrated reporting (as prescribed by the King III Report), however, 
only became mandatory for all JSE-listed companies in 2011 (Global Sustainable 
Investment Alliance 2012; Pretorius 2011). Depending on their financial year end 
(before or after 1 March 2010), some JSE-listed companies only started to comply with 
the guidelines of the King III Report after their 2010 financial year end. In addition, 
many companies with a financial year end after 1 March 2010 aimed to comply with 
the guidelines of the King II Report for the largest part of their 2010 financial year. 
For the sake of consistency, the recommendations of the King II Report were applied 
for the entire study period.
The main purpose of this article was to present a comprehensive longitudinal 
overview of the corporate governance practices of listed companies in South Africa. 
The objectives were twofold. The first objective was to conduct an empirical analysis 
of the corporate governance practices of selected JSE-listed companies over the 
period 2002 to 2010. This was done by means of content analysis of the selected 
companies’ annual reports. The second objective was to determine whether the 
corporate governance practices of listed companies differed from those of companies 
that delisted during the research period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the following section presents 
the theoretical background of the paper. Subsequently, the research methodology 
is described, followed by a discussion of the research findings. Based on the study’s 
findings, conclusions and recommendations are then presented. In the last section, 
limitations of the study and suggestions for future research are provided.
Theoretical background
1As mentioned previously, the concept of corporate governance developed as a result 
of the agency problem (Daily et al. 2003). Various corporate governance mechanisms 
have been developed globally in an attempt to curb the negative consequences 
associated with this problem (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006). In the following section, 
the phenomenon will be defined in more detail. Examples of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the South African context will also be provided.
Defi ning corporate governance
1There is no consensus amongst academics and practitioners regarding the most 
appropriate definition of corporate governance. Mallin (2011) states that two 
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different, though related, definitions of corporate governance have been advanced 
in academic literature. Corporate governance is defined in the Cadbury Report 
as ‘the system by which firms are directed and controlled’ (Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 1992). This definition implies that 
the main responsibility for the corporate governance practices of listed companies 
lies with their boards of directors. The South African King Reports also use this 
definition (Rossouw et al. 2002). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 2004:11) defines corporate governance as a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, board, shareholders and other 
stakeholders. According to this definition, the focus should be placed on the interests 
of a company’s relevant stakeholders and not just on the shareholders’ best interests. 
The OECD’s definition is thus an extension of the traditional finance paradigm 
that shareholders’ wealth maximisation should be the primary goal of a company’s 
managers.
From the early 1990s onwards, an increasing number of corporate governance 
guidelines and codes were published globally to safeguard the interests of stakeholders, 
and particularly those of shareholders (Bjuggren & Mueller 2009; Fombrun 2006). 
Most corporate governance codes are based on two main principles, namely disclosure 
and appropriate checks and balances. These codes are generally not statutory, 
although listed companies tend to adopt at least some of the recommendations. The 
reason for companies’ voluntary compliance is that in several countries, the stock 
exchange’s listing requirements oblige listed companies to comply with the code’s 
recommendations or justify non-compliance (Grandori 2004). In South Africa, the 
JSE listing requirements oblige public companies to report on their compliance with 
the King guidelines.
King Reports on corporate governance
1After the 1994 democratic election, extensive regulatory reform led to both social and 
political transformation in South Africa. As such, the country started to draw more 
attention from foreign investors (Abdo & Fisher 2007; UNECA 2007). Pre-1994, 
foreign institutional investors heavily criticised JSE-listed companies’ inefficient 
corporate structures and systems (Malherbe & Segal 2001). This critique and 
the withholding of capital as a result thereof led to the development of corporate 
governance guidelines for listed companies operating in South Africa.
The first King Report on corporate governance was published in 1994. The focus of 
this report was on issues relating to the board of directors and shareholder protection 
(IoDSA 1994). Between 1994 and 2002, extensive regulatory changes occurred in 
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the country, including the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 
1995) and Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998). The first King Report was 
subsequently adapted to take these developments into account. The King II Report 
became active in 2002 (Mallin 2007). According to Naidoo (2002) and Mallin (2007), 
this report was ground-breaking in terms of its recommendations and outlook. The 
King II Report provided information concerning, inter alia, the composition of the 
board, risk management, remuneration and sustainability (IoDSA 2009).
The revision of South Africa’s corporate governance guidelines is an on-going 
concern (Rossouw et al. 2002). The publication of the King III Report in 2009 
became necessary due to the promulgation of the new Companies Act (No. 71 of 
2008) as well as changes in international corporate governance trends (IoDSA 2009). 
The focus of this report is on integrated reporting. The JSE once again adapted its 
listing requirements according to the King Report’s recommendations.
Whereas the first two King Reports followed a ‘comply or explain’ approach, the 
King III Report follows an ‘apply or explain’ approach. The focus is now placed 
on how the principles of the King III Report are applied in practice (Malan 2010). 
This ‘apply or explain’ approach might, however, lead to the perception that if 
managers and directors cannot adhere to the King guidelines, they can alter the 
interpretation thereof (Carte 2009). This state of affairs could understandably lead to 
non-compliance with the King recommendations.
One of the main differences between the King II and III Reports is the enhanced 
focus on integrated reporting (PwC 2009). The King II Report included a chapter on 
sustainability reporting, paving the way for the concept of triple bottom line reporting 
(focusing on economic, social and environmental considerations). Due to growing 
attention to sustainability issues, the King III Report requires that companies should 
publish their financial and non-financial information in a so-called integrated report 
(PwC 2009). The Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa (2011) was formed 
in May 2010 to develop guidelines for the integrated reporting practices of JSE-listed 
companies. In 2011, this committee developed a framework for integrated reporting. 
As a result, the first mandatory integrated reporting period for JSE-listed companies 
was 2011 (Eccles, Krzus & Ribot 2015; Pretorius 2011).
Companies gradually started to report on environmental, social and corporate 
governance aspects over the past few years (Epstein & Buhovac 2014). Corporate 
role players are also starting to realise that corporate governance compliance should 
be regarded as a business imperative rather than a mere obligation. Advantages 
associated with sound corporate governance compliance include the enhancement 
of a company’s reputation (being a responsible corporate citizen), sustainable growth 
and possible long-term value creation (Madhani 2007).
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Measuring the corporate governance practices of listed companies
1Since corporate governance is an abstract concept, the measurement of a company’s 
corporate governance practices can be challenging. In line with the Cadbury Report’s 
definition of corporate governance (which is also employed by the King Reports), 
the board of directors is regarded as the focal point of the corporate governance 
system. It is hence not surprising that the composition of the board of directors 
is one of the most widely studied corporate governance aspects globally (Denis & 
McConnell 2003). As an increasing number of corporate governance guidelines 
were introduced globally, attention was also given to, inter alia, director emolument 
(Dalton & Daily 2001) and sustainability reporting (Kolk 2004).
Corporate governance research instruments were subsequently developed by a 
number of researchers in developed markets. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
developed a Governance Index for United States of America (USA) listed companies, 
based on 24 corporate governance rules, including voting rights and directors’ 
compensation. Brown and Caylor (2004: 3) designed the Gov-Score measure based 
on the US corporate governance framework. The Gov-Score consists of 51 factors 
encompassing eight corporate governance categories including the directorate, 
emolument and ownership structure. Since these two metrics were designed for usage 
in a developed country, they were not applicable in the emerging market context.
The corporate governance research instruments and approaches of previous 
South African researchers were examined and compared in order to find the most 
appropriate research instrument for the purpose of this study. Two requirements had 
to be met, namely the instrument should be applicable to listed and delisted South 
African companies as well as over the entire research period.
Abdo and Fisher (2007) considered the impact of corporate governance 
disclosure on the financial performance of 97 companies listed on the JSE during 
2003 and 2005. Their corporate governance measure consisted of 29 corporate 
governance considerations, based on the King II Report and the Standard and Poor’s 
International Corporate Governance Score Index. In the current study, a more 
extensive corporate governance research instrument, consisting of nine categories 
(comprising 39 recommendations) was used. While Abdo and Fisher (2007) excluded 
delisted companies from their sample, the current researchers analysed the corporate 
governance practices of both JSE-listed and delisted companies over a nine-year 
period.
Moloi (2008) assessed the corporate governance reporting of the Top 40 JSE-listed 
companies in 2006. He used a corporate governance checklist based on specific King 
II recommendations. Two limitations of his study were that only the 40 largest listed 
companies were examined for only one year. Ntim et al. (2012) also examined the 
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corporate governance disclosure practices of JSE-listed companies (based on 50 King 
II provisions) for the period 2002 to 2006.
These authors focused on corporate governance disclosure and did not assign 
an acceptability score to the considered companies. In the current study, both the 
disclosure and acceptability dimensions of selected JSE-listed companies’ corporate 
governance practices were analysed.
The Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa (2010) designed the Public 
Investment Corporation (PIC) corporate governance rating matrix to measure the 
corporate governance compliance practices of JSE-listed companies. In contrast to 
the other measuring instruments that were discussed in this section, the PIC matrix 
contained a disclosure and an acceptability dimension. The PIC matrix was identified 
as the most comprehensive and well-tested corporate governance research instrument 
to employ in the local context. After permission was obtained from the Centre, the 
researchers refined the matrix for the purpose of this study. The adapted matrix 
is based on selected King II recommendations and existing corporate governance 
literature.
Research methodology
1This study is deemed to be descriptive in nature as it provided a description of the 
corporate governance practices of selected JSE-listed companies. Table 1 provides 
details on the population and sample.
Table 1: Compilation of the population and sample
cdxxxi2002 cdxxxii2003 cdxxxiii2004 cdxxxiv2005 cdxxxv2006 cdxxxvi2007 cdxxxvii2008 cdxxxviii2009 cdxxxix2010 cdxlTotal
cdxliPopulation cdxlii451 cdxliii411 cdxliv389 cdxlv373 cdxlvi389 cdxlvii411 cdxlviii411 cdxlix398 cdl397 cdli3 630
cdliiSample cdliii191 cdliv192 cdlv166 cdlvi161 cdlvii146 cdlviii141 cdlix150 cdlx151 cdlxi141 cdlxii1 439(a)
(a)  1439 corporate governance scores were compiled for 230 JSE-listed fi rms over the research period.
1Source: Based on data from the World Federation of Exchanges (2014)
1The population consisted of all JSE-listed companies for the period 2002 to 2010. 
In line with previous corporate governance researchers (Lamport, Latona, Seetanah 
& Sannassee 2011; Saravanan 2012; Uadiale 2012), the non-probability judgement 
sampling technique was employed. The researchers used their judgement to include 
companies from six of the ten JSE industries, namely the health care, consumer 
goods, consumer services, industrials, telecommunications and technology industries 
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(hereafter referred to as considered industries). The population companies did not 
all have an equal chance of being selected, since certain industries were excluded.
The reason for the exclusion of the basic materials, oil and gas and financials 
industries was that the nature of these companies’ activities and the financial 
reporting thereof differ from that of the considered industries. Since the corporate 
governance data were originally collected to consider the relationship between the 
corporate governance practices and financial performance of JSE-listed companies 
as part of a larger corporate governance study, the differing nature of the companies’ 
financial reports had to be taken into account. Financial companies’ activities also 
tend to be more regulated than those of companies operating in the considered 
industries. No companies were listed in the utilities industry during the study period.
Companies were included in the sample based on their compliance with four 
criteria, namely:
• The company formed part of the considered industries.
• The company’s annual reports were available in the McGregor BFA (2013) 
database (now called INET BFA).
• The company was listed for the entire calendar year under consideration.
• Company-specific data were available for at least two consecutive years during 
the study period. This was done to ensure enough data points for the purposes of 
statistical analysis.
1The corporate governance practices of companies that were listed for the entire 
research period were hence examined over a period of nine years. Newly listed 
companies were included in the sample if they complied with the above-mentioned 
criteria. Furthermore, if delisted companies complied with the criteria, their 
corporate governance practices were examined for the years that they were listed on 
the JSE.
An attempt was thus made to reduce survivorship bias. The total exclusion of 
companies that delisted from the stock exchange during the considered research 
period could skew the results. Companies that remain listed are often financially 
more successful than those that delisted (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson & Ross 
1992). Sampling bias could result from the exclusion of small companies (in terms of 
market capitalisation) from a study’s sample. To limit sampling bias, no companies 
were excluded from the sample based on their market capitalisation.
Data collection and analysis
1While secondary corporate governance data sources are often used by developed 
market researchers, such data are typically not readily available to emerging market 
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researchers. The required data on JSE-listed companies’ corporate governance 
practices were indeed not publicly available in a usable format when this study 
commenced. The PIC matrix was therefore refined and used to compile a 
comprehensive corporate governance score for each of the sample companies.
The refined instrument consisted of nine categories. The respective labels and 
approximate percentage of each category (based on disclosure and acceptability 
dimensions) in relation to the total score (out of 74) were as follows: board composition 
(18.9%), board committees (8.1%), individual directors (8.1%), director remuneration 
(9.5%), shareholding (4.1%), accounting and auditing (8.1%), risk disclosure and 
reporting (5.4%), corporate culture and behaviour (27.0%) and sustainability 
reporting (10.8%). The categories, comprising of 39 recommendations, were mainly 
based on selected King II recommendations. The specific recommendations cannot 
be indicated due to a confidentiality agreement between the researchers and the 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa.
Conceptual content analysis was employed to compile annual corporate 
governance scores for each of the sample companies for each year that the company 
was listed on the JSE over the research period. Previous researchers (such as Al-
Moataz & Hussainey 2012; Bhasin 2012; Gupta, Nair & Gogula 2003; Moloi 2008; 
Murthy 2008) also used content analysis to compile corporate governance scores for 
individual companies. Attention was given to disclosure and acceptability dimensions 
whilst constructing annual corporate governance scores, as indicated by equation 1.




1The focus of the disclosure dimension was on whether information regarding the 
recommendation under consideration was indicated/not indicated in the annual 
report of a company. With regard to the acceptability dimension, the researchers 
aimed to determine whether a company correctly applied the specific King II 
recommendation. Key words, based on the King II Report and existing literature, 
were used to conduct word searches in the sample companies’ annual reports in 
order to allocate disclosure and acceptability scores. For example, if the roles of both 
the chairperson and chief executive officer (CEO) were indicated in a company’s 
annual report, the disclosure criterion was met. According to the King II Report, the 
roles of the chairperson and CEO should be separated (IoDSA 2002). If the CEO 
also acted as the chairperson of the board, the acceptability criterion was therefore 
not met by the specific company.
The dichotomous variables 0 and 1 were used to code the observed corporate 
governance information. If the disclosure criterion was met for a specific 
recommendation, it was coded 1. If no information could be found on the specific 
n=0
35
N. Mans-Kemp, P. Erasmus & S. Viviers
80
recommendation in a company’s annual report, it was coded 0. Attention was only 
given to the acceptability criterion if a code of 1 was allocated for the disclosure 
criterion. If the acceptability criterion was also met, it was coded 1; if not, it was 
coded 0. The maximum score that a selected company could receive was 74. The 
overall score consisted of a maximum total score of 39 for disclosure and 35 for 
acceptability. Acceptability criteria were not set for four of the corporate governance 
recommendations (gender and race of board members, individual executive director 
remuneration and the disclosure of shareholding), since no clear acceptability 
guidelines could be determined.
The research instrument was applied over the complete study period by one data 
coder. After the data had been collected, the coding of the disclosure and acceptability 
dimensions was double-checked by the data coder. The allocated scores per category 
were compared with the disclosure and acceptability guidelines per variable to ensure 
that the allocated codes were in line with the stated criteria.
The collected quantitative data were processed using Microsoft Excel and Statistica. 
Descriptive statistics were used to summarise the collected data. Furthermore, a 
mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether the 
mean corporate governance scores of the listed companies differed significantly from 
the mean scores of the delisted companies, as well as over the research period. This 
model includes both fixed effects and random effects factors (Reinard 2006). For the 
purpose of the current study, the considered fixed effects factors were ‘year’, ‘listed/
delisted’ and ‘year listed/delisted interaction’ (denoted as ‘year’ listed/delisted’). The 
random effects factor was ‘company’.
A restricted maximum likelihood solution with type III decomposition was 
performed to estimate the variance components of the random effects in the mixed-
model ANOVA. The ANOVA’s overall F-test indicated a significant difference 
between the considered factors. The Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) test 
was therefore used to make pair-wise comparisons amongst the sample means to 
determine where the differences occurred.
Research fi ndings
1This section presents details on the corporate governance practices of the sample 
companies.
Trends in the annual corporate governance scores
1The results of the descriptive analysis that were conducted on the 1 439 annual 
corporate governance scores are provided in Table 2.
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Table 2: Corporate governance scores of the sample companies (a)







cdlxix2002 cdlxx191 cdlxxi39 cdlxxii39 cdlxxiii9 cdlxxiv67 cdlxxv12
cdlxxvi2003 cdlxxvii192 cdlxxviii45 cdlxxix47 cdlxxx10 cdlxxxi69 cdlxxxii12
cdlxxxiii2004 cdlxxxiv166 cdlxxxv49 cdlxxxvi51 cdlxxxvii9 cdlxxxviii72 cdlxxxix12
cdxc2005 cdxci161 cdxcii51 cdxciii53 cdxciv13 cdxcv71 cdxcvi12
cdxcvii2006 cdxcviii146 cdxcix52 d54 di16 dii71 diii12
div2007 dv141 dvi52 dvii56 dviii16 dix70 dx12
dxi2008 dxii150 dxiii55 dxiv57 dxv14 dxvi72 dxvii11
dxviii2009 dxix151 dxx57 dxxi59 dxxii21 dxxiii72 dxxiv10
dxxv2010 dxxvi141 dxxvii59 dxxviii62 dxxix27 dxxx74 dxxxi10
dxxxiiOverall period dxxxiii1 439 dxxxiv50 dxxxv53 dxxxvi9 dxxxvii74 dxxxviii13
(a)  The lowest potential score was 0 and the highest potential score was 74; values were rounded to the closest 
integer.
1As indicated in Table 2, the mean and median scores exhibited a similar consistently 
increasing trend over the research period. A possible explanation for this development 
is that, over time, directors became more accustomed to the King recommendations. 
In addition, based on the content analysis, it was evident that companies gradually 
introduced compliance mechanisms (e.g. a compliance officer). Such mechanisms 
might assist directors and managers to establish more efficient corporate governance 
practices. Despite the overall increasing compliance trend, the sample companies 
only complied with approximately 68% of the corporate governance criteria for 
the overall period. It was thus evident that some companies did not pay adequate 
attention to sound corporate governance practices.
The minimum corporate governance score increased from approximately 12% 
in 2002 to 36% in 2010. The two companies that obtained a score of 12% (in 2002 
and 2004) subsequently delisted from the JSE. Frost, Racca and Stanford (2012) 
indicated that weak corporate governance compliance could be symptomatic of larger 
corporate feasibility problems. It should, however, be noted that not all companies 
that exhibited low compliance necessarily delisted from the JSE in subsequent years. 
Some companies with very low corporate governance scores in 2002 (equal to or 
below 25% compliance) improved their corporate governance practices over time. As 
a result, the minimum score tripled from 2002 to 2010. The corporate governance 
scores of the companies with the highest compliance in 2002 (equal to or greater 
than 75% compliance) also improved over time, albeit with a smaller increase (from 
approximately 91% to 100%) than their counterparts that had very low levels of 
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compliance. Based on the content analysis, the researchers observed that companies 
that considerably improved their compliance practices often stated that it takes time 
to create an efficient corporate governance structure and compliance mechanisms.
The standard deviation for the overall period was 18%, indicating some variation 
in the dataset. Given the fact that the sample contained companies that formed 
part of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index as well as companies that delisted within a few 
years from their listing date, the results were not surprising. Companies that formed 
part of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index would be expected to deliver good corporate 
governance compliance results, because they are more ‘in the public eye’ and thus 
subject to greater stakeholder scrutiny. The delisted companies were anticipated to 
have poorer corporate governance compliance practices. Some delisted companies’ 
directors and managers possibly lacked intent and skills to properly comply with the 
King guidelines. In addition, some companies that delisted could have experienced a 
lack of resources to fund costly corporate governance initiatives.
Disclosure and acceptability dimensions
1The mean disclosure and acceptability scores were divided by the total score of 
74. This was done to determine the contribution of both dimensions to the mean 
annual scores that were reported in Table 2. The sample included 71 delisted firms 
that contributed 260 of the 1439 annual corporate governance observations. No 
delisted firms formed part of the sample for the year 2010. Figure 1 provides a visual 
representation of the disclosure and acceptability dimensions for all the sample 
companies and separately for the listed and delisted companies.
Figure 1 reveals that in 2002, the mean corporate governance score for all firms 
was approximately 52%. Disclosure contributed 32% and acceptability 20% to this 
score. At that stage (2002), the sample companies seemed to have below average (less 
than 50%) compliance with the acceptability guidelines. The listed and delisted 
companies gradually improved their compliance with both the disclosure and 
acceptability dimensions over the research period.
Three delisted companies formed part of the sample in 2009. As seen in Figure 
1, these companies had higher corporate governance compliance than their listed 
counterparts in the given year. A possible reason for the subsequent delisting of these 
highly compliant companies is that their sound corporate governance practices made 
them attractive targets for a merger or acquisition attempt. Alternatively, their boards 
and managers could have regarded corporate governance initiatives as unnecessary 
red tape that slows down decision-making processes. As a result, companies with 
high levels of corporate governance compliance might decide to delist to avoid time-
Advances in the corporate governance practices of Johannesburg Stock Exchange companies
83 
1
Figure 1: Disclosure and acceptability dimensions of the mean annual corporate governance scores
1consuming compliance activities in future (Solomon 2007). The actual reasons that 
were provided for the delisting of the three observed companies included a takeover 
(Wessels 2010), a merger (Prinsloo 2011) and unfavourable market sentiment 
towards small JSE-listed companies in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis (I-Net Bridge 2010).
In 2010, the mean corporate governance score for all firms was almost 80%. This 
score hence increased substantially (by 27%) over the research period. Furthermore, 
the acceptability dimension contributed about 35% to the mean score for the complete 
sample in 2010, an increase of almost 15% since 2002. The sample companies hence 
not only improved their disclosure of corporate governance considerations, but they 
also revealed more acceptable compliance practices over time. This is a promising 
result for investors who consider the corporate governance compliance practices of 
JSE-listed companies when making investment decisions.
As previously mentioned, acceptability guidelines were not set for four corporate 
governance recommendations, since no clear guidelines were available. A company 
could receive a maximum score of 39 for disclosure and 35 for acceptability. The two 
dimensions thus did not contribute equally to the total corporate governance score of 
74. To examine the development of the disclosure and acceptability dimensions over 
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time, the annual mean scores were considered as a percentage out of the maximum 
total scores (39 and 35 respectively), as shown in Table 3.
Table 3:  Annual mean disclosure and acceptability scores (%)
dxxxix2002 dxl2003 dxli2004 dxlii2005 dxliii2006 dxliv2007 dxlv2008 dxlvi2009 dxlvii2010
dxlviiiMean disclosure score (a) dxlix23.895 dl26.771 dli28.669 dlii29.503 dliii30.212 dliv30.340 dlv31.227 dlvi32.232 dlvii32.979
dlviiiPercentage (out of 39) dlix61.270 dlx68.643 dlxi73.509 dlxii75.649 dlxiii77.468 dlxiv77.796 dlxv80.068 dlxvi82.646 dlxvii84.561
dlxviiiMean acceptability score (a) dlxix14.654 dlxx17.766 dlxxi20.145 dlxxii21.099 dlxxiii21.870 dlxxiv22.078 dlxxv23.340 dlxxvi24.887 dlxxvii25.872
dlxxviiiPercentage (out of 35) dlxxix41.870 dlxxx50.759 dlxxxi57.556 dlxxxii60.284 dlxxxiii62.485 dlxxxiv63.080 dlxxxv66.686 dlxxxvi71.107 dlxxxvii73.921
(a) Unrounded mean scores were used for calculations.
1As seen in Table 3, although the mean disclosure score was above 50% in 2002, 
the mean acceptability score was less than 50% in the given year. It hence appears 
that the sample companies struggled to correctly apply the corporate governance 
guidelines during that year. In line with this observation, it was evident from the 
content analysis of the 2002 annual reports that some sample companies tended to 
explain their non-compliance with selected King II guidelines. Such companies 
hence complied with the ‘comply or explain’ guideline, but their compliance per se 
was not acceptable.
Both the disclosure and acceptability scores increased rapidly between 2002 and 
2010. Improvements of approximately 23% and 32% can be seen in Table 3 for disclosure 
and acceptability respectively over the study period. This is a positive development, 
since the sample companies not only improved their corporate governance disclosure, 
but also had more acceptable corporate governance compliance practices at the end 
of the research period.
Corporate governance categories
1A firm’s total corporate governance score was based on nine categories. Details on 
the annual mean scores per category are provided in Table 4.
An increasing trend can be observed for all nine categories between 2002 and 
2010. The board composition, board committees and individual directors’ categories 
showed large improvements between 2002 and 2005. The mean scores for the 
corporate culture and behaviour, and sustainability reporting categories improved 
considerably during the second half of the research period (2007 to 2010). It hence 
seems as if the sample companies initially focused their compliance efforts on board-
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Table 4: Mean scores per category (% out of 74)
dlxxxviiiCategory dlxxxix2002 dxc2003 dxci2004 dxcii2005 dxciii2006 dxciv2007 dxcv2008 dxcvi2009 dxcvii2010
dxcviii1: Board composition dxcix9.374 dc11.311 dci12.480 dcii13.027 dciii13.236 dciv13.523 dcv14.415 dcvi15.330 dcvii15.785
dcviii2: Board committees dcix3.149 dcx3.780 dcxi4.208 dcxii4.457 dcxiii4.822 dcxiv4.850 dcxv5.027 dcxvi5.423 dcxvii5.770
dcxviii3: Individual directors dcxix3.984 dcxx5.272 dcxxi5.959 dcxxii6.245 dcxxiii6.470 dcxxiv6.478 dcxxv6.766 dcxxvi7.034 dcxxvii7.150
dcxxviii4: Director remuneration dcxxix6.530 dcxxx6.792 dcxxxi7.204 dcxxxii7.436 dcxxxiii7.507 dcxxxiv7.628 dcxxxv7.865 dcxxxvi8.170 dcxxxvii8.281
dcxxxviii5: Shareholding dcxxxix1.931 dcxl2.808 dcxli2.891 dcxlii2.988 dcxliii3.027 dcxliv3.124 dcxlv3.207 dcxlvi3.311 dcxlvii3.258
dcxlviii6: Accounting and auditing dcxlix6.919 dcl7.024 dcli7.131 dclii7.303 dcliii7.341 dcliv7.322 dclv7.405 dclvi7.634 dclvii7.754
dclviii7:  Risk disclosure and reporting dclix5.016 dclx5.208 dclxi5.308 dclxii5.304 dclxiii5.369 dclxiv5.368 dclxv5.405 dclxvi5.405 dclxvii5.405
dclxviii8:  Corporate culture and 
behaviour
dclxix13.223 dclxx15.372 dclxxi17.405 dclxxii17.777 dclxxiii18.539 dclxxiv18.315 dclxxv19.081 dclxxvi19.993 dclxxvii20.539
dclxxviii9: Sustainability reporting dclxxix1.966 dclxxx2.619 dclxxxi3.378 dclxxxii3.845 dclxxxiii4.073 dclxxxiv4.227 dclxxxv4.568 dclxxxvi4.886 dclxxxvii5.588
dclxxxviiiTotal annual score dclxxxix52.092 dcxc60.186 dcxci65.964 dcxcii68.382 dcxciii70.384 dcxciv70.835 dcxcv73.739 dcxcvi77.186 dcxcvii79.530
1related categories that were ‘easier to comply with’, whereas enhanced attention was 
given to the corporate culture and behaviour and sustainability reporting categories 
during and after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Given local social challenges, 
such as unemployment, corruption and HIV/AIDS, aspects related to corporate 
culture and sustainability deserve more attention in future.
The reported descriptive statistics indicate that the mean corporate governance 
scores of the sample companies increased steadily over the study period. The mean 
scores of the listed and delisted companies, however, appeared to differ (refer to Figure 
1). Inferential analyses were therefore conducted to determine the significance of the 
observed trend in the mean corporate governance scores over time, as well as the 
perceived difference between the scores of the listed and delisted companies.
Mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher’s LSD test results
1A mixed-model ANOVA was used to consider differences in the corporate governance 
scores of the sample companies over the entire study period. The results of this test 
are displayed in Table 5.









dcciiiYear dcciv7 dccv1037 dccvi112.629** dccvii0.000
dccviiiListed/delisted dccix1 dccx225 dccxi11.484** dccxii0.001
dccxiiiYear listed/delisted dccxiv7 dccxv1037 dccxvi1.110 dccxvii0.354
** Signifi cant at the 1% level * Signifi cant at the 5% level
1(a) Conducted for the period 2002–2009, since there were no delisted companies in the sample for 2010.
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To determine whether the mean corporate governance scores differed significantly 
from one year to the next, the Fisher’s LSD test was used. The results of this test are 
shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Results of the Fisher’s LSD test (mean corporate governance scores over time)
dccxviiiYear dccxix2002 dccxx2003 dccxxi2004 dccxxii2005 dccxxiii2006 dccxxiv2007 dccxxv2008 dccxxvi2009 dccxxvii2010
dccxxviii2002 dccxxix0.000** dccxxx0.000** dccxxxi0.000** dccxxxii0.000** dccxxxiii0.000** dccxxxiv0.000** dccxxxv0.000** dccxxxvi0.000**
dccxxxvii2003 dccxxxviii0.000** dccxxxix0.000** dccxl0.000** dccxli0.000** dccxlii0.000** dccxliii0.000** dccxliv0.000**
dccxlv2004 dccxlvi0.000** dccxlvii0.000** dccxlviii0.000** dccxlix0.000** dccl0.000** dccli0.000**
dcclii2005 dccliii0.171 dccliv0.001** dcclv0.000** dcclvi0.000** dcclvii0.000**
dcclviii2006 dcclix0.065 dcclx0.000** dcclxi0.000** dcclxii0.000**




** Signifi cant at the 1% level * Signifi cant at the 5% level
1
1As seen in the first row of Table 5, the mean corporate governance scores of the 
sample companies differed significantly over the entire study period. Furthermore, 
review of Table 6 shows that all the annual increases in the mean corporate 
governance scores were statistically significant, except for the annual increases from 
2005 to 2006 and 2006 to 2007. In the second row of Table 5, a significant difference 
can be observed between the corporate governance scores of the listed and delisted 
companies. These results were not surprising. As time progressed, it is likely that 
directors and managers became more familiar with the recommendations of the 
King II Report. In addition, the JSE Listing Requirements (JSE 2005) obligated 
listed companies to disclose their compliance with the King II Report’s guidelines 
or to explain non-compliance. Previous researchers (such as Chiraz & Anis 2013; 
Serve, Martinez & Djama 2012) also found that delisted companies generally had 
weaker and less effective corporate governance mechanisms than listed companies.
Companies that remained listed on the JSE were thus expected to improve their 
corporate governance practices over time. Those who failed to do so increasingly 
became targets for shareholder activists. As most institutional investors in South Africa 
engage with investee companies behind closed doors (Winfield 2011), it is difficult 
to gauge the nature of the issues raised. Research among institutional investors does, 
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however, suggest that corporate governance concerns feature prominently on the 
engagement agenda (Eccles, Nicholls & De Jongh 2007).
Conclusions and recommendations
1It was argued in the introduction of this article that the concept of corporate 
governance originated as a result of the agency problem. This problem became 
very prominent in the 20th century, mainly due to dispersed ownership structures 
(Rossouw et al. 2002). South Africa is widely considered as a pioneer in the field 
of corporate governance. The first King Report provided very specific corporate 
governance guidelines to JSE-listed companies. This report was revised in the early 
2000s due to changes in legislation and global corporate governance developments.
The recommendations of the King II Report were applied by the researchers to 
analyse the corporate governance practices of 230 JSE-listed companies over a nine-
year period. In contrast to previous researchers who focused on the disclosure of 
corporate governance practices, the current researchers also considered whether a 
company’s directors and managers correctly applied the King II guidelines (referred 
to as the acceptability dimension). Content analysis was conducted on the published 
annual reports of the sample companies to compile an annual corporate governance 
score for each company for the applicable years that it was listed on the JSE.
The sample companies substantially improved their corporate governance 
disclosure over the research period. A possible reason for this trend is that the JSE 
enforced such disclosure through its listing requirements. The sample companies also 
exhibited more acceptable compliance practices in 2010 than in 2002. It is likely that 
corporate role players gained a better understanding of the accurate implementation 
of the King II guidelines over time. Shareholder activists could also have enforced 
JSE-listed companies to put acceptable corporate governance mechanisms in place. 
As a result, the considered companies’ managers and directors could have attempted 
to gradually ‘do things [the implementation of corporate governance principles] 
right’, instead of merely disclosing their compliance or the lack thereof. Acceptable 
corporate governance compliance can provide a sustainable competitive advantage to 
firms (Madhani 2007).
It should be noted that some sample companies possibly already had moderate 
compliance with the King II guidelines at the beginning of the study period. Over 
time, these companies’ corporate role players could have learned how to properly 
disclose their compliance practices in their annual reports. As a result, such companies 
could have received higher corporate governance scores towards 2010. The actual 
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corporate governance practices of such companies did not necessarily improve, but 
their disclosure did.
Although the average corporate governance scores improved over the study 
period, the sample companies, on average, only complied with approximately 68% of 
the corporate governance criteria for the overall period. It was also evident from the 
content analysis that some sample companies did not pay attention to the appropriate 
implementation of the King II guidelines. The question of how acceptable corporate 
governance practices can be enhanced in future thus arises.
Inexperienced directors and managers require more in-house training to 
properly understand the implementation of the King guidelines. If these corporate 
role players act inappropriately, they might cause damage to the reputation of their 
company. If managers and directors are properly trained, they might be able to 
act more appropriately when faced with various corporate governance challenges. 
Possible reputational damage might then be reduced. The observed lack of corporate 
governance compliance also provides opportunities for consultants and private sector 
training providers to train directors on various corporate governance-related aspects. 
If a consultant is used, the service can be tailor-made to meet the specific needs of a 
company’s directors and managers.
The listed companies had higher mean corporate governance scores than their 
delisted counterparts for the largest part of the study period. Not all the sample 
companies’ role-players were, however, interested in complying with the King 
guidelines. In the annual reports of some well-known listed and delisted companies, 
managers and directors questioned whether a costly tick-box compliance approach 
really aids corporate governance in practice. It was also questioned whether the 
standardised King guidelines are actually applicable to all companies. These are 
valid concerns. If compliance initiatives become too costly, in terms of both time 
allocation and financial expenses, companies’ decision-makers might decide not to 
voluntarily comply with some of the King guidelines in future.
Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research
1Companies that were listed in the basic materials, oil and gas, and financials 
industries were excluded from the sample. The reasons for the exclusion were that 
the nature of these companies’ activities, the degree of regulation and financial 
reporting differ from those of the sample companies. Basic materials and financials 
are two large industries in the South African economy. The companies that were 
listed in the excluded industries could possibly have provided different results from 
those of the considered industries. In future, a similar study could be conducted 
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to analyse the corporate governance practices of companies listed in these three 
industries.
The study was conducted over the period 2002 to 2010. Specific attention was 
given to the recommendations of the King II Report. It should be noted that the 
limited timeframe excluded the possible impact of the King III Report on issues 
such as integrated reporting. Other corporate governance researchers could conduct 
a similar study in future, based on the recommendations of the King III Report. 
The relationship between corporate governance compliance and various financial 
performance measures could then be investigated.
The researchers assessed the corporate governance practices of selected JSE-
listed companies by means of content analysis. Future researchers could conduct 
interviews with the managers and directors of JSE-listed companies to determine 
their perceptions on the actual value that corporate governance compliance activities 
add to their firms. Specific attention could also be given to the impact of corporate 
governance on JSE-listed companies’ reputation.
Improvements were observed in the sample companies’ corporate governance 
compliance practices (both in terms of disclosure and acceptability) over the research 
period. If this trend continues in future, stakeholders might continue to benefit from 
the sound corporate governance practices of local companies.
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